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TITLE:

"IT'S JUST NOT CRICKET" – THE ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS AND THEIR
RELEVANCE TO CURRENT OPERATIONS.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Preface

"We want to be able to farm our land, send our children to school and for there to be no more fighting in the area. We are not interested in the development you offer."

Community Leader, Shin Kalay, Helmand Province, 12 December 2008

Prior to attending Command and Staff Course, I commanded J Company 42 Commando Royal Marines. During this period, I deployed on Operation HERRICK 9 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Concurrently the Company Second-in-Command deployed with an element of the Company to Kabul (See Appendix B). This experience gave me a brief insight into the complexity of the issues faced by ISAF on current operations. The contrast between the level of development in Kabul and Helmand was stark. In the rural areas in which I worked ethnic ties had primacy over the notion of Afghan nationality. Indeed, in Nad-e-Ali province, less than ten miles west of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, those leaders that I met did not readily identify with President Karzai and the Government in Kabul. To gain a greater understanding of the culture and how the British were perceived by the Afghan people I started investigating the British experience on the North West Frontier during the Nineteenth Century. In addition, I was keen to see whether there are any enduring lessons. In keeping with the volatility of the region, there is much dispute over the spelling of place names. Whenever possible I have attempted to use contemporary terminology in order to enable quick comparison with the current operating environment.

My thanks go to Dr. Eric Shibuya for his guidance, direction and patience during this period and the Staff of the Gray Research Center who have provided diligent support throughout.

Executive Summary

Title: “It’s Just Not Cricket” – The Anglo-Afghan Wars and Their Relevance To Current Operations.

Author: Major S A Turner, Royal Marines

Thesis: The British experience in Afghanistan in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries provides useful lessons which can be applied to current ISAF operations.

Discussion: Afghanistan has been of strategic significance to global powers for hundreds of years. Between 1839 and 1919 the imperial Forces of the British Empire engaged in three Anglo-Afghan Wars. At the time of Britain’s first intervention in Afghanistan it was assessed that the most vulnerable flank of the empire was the North West Frontier; what today is Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. Czarist Russia was expanding south at the time and a covert struggle for control of the Afghan region ensued which became known as “The Great Game”. In order to protect India from the perceived Russian threat, and thus enable continued economic development, the British adopted a proactive “forward policy.” This saw Britain deploy forces into Afghanistan and replace the Amir with a more malleable successor in order to achieve forward defense of the homeland, India. The intent was not to colonize but to prevent the Russian advance by controlling Afghanistan’s foreign policy. However, the occupying force soon realized it was easier to defeat the tribes than control them. During an eighty year period the British expended significant “blood and treasure” to achieve limited operational success and strategic failure. Upon their withdrawal in 1919, the British had suffered a significant blow to their national prestige, caused deep rooted resentment among the local population and unintentionally bolstered Afghan unity as the tribes fought to evict the occupying troops. Critically, the British failed to achieve their strategic objectives despite notable success at the operational level. In the Nineteenth Century, the British strategic objective was to control Afghan foreign policy and thus neuter the perceived threat to British India from Russia. ISAF’s strategic objective is to establish Afghanistan as a stable State, which does not pose a threat to the security of the international community.

Conclusion: Parallels can be drawn between the British desire for forward defense in the nineteenth century and the desire to establish a stable Afghanistan today. The enduring influence of *pashtunwali* makes study of the British experience relevant to current operations. The unique social dynamics of the Afghan tribes must be understood and expectations adjusted accordingly. At the operational level, the failure of the British to engage with the local population or use force proportionately reinforced the Afghan will to fight. Tribal engagement is critical if a representative governmental system with local popular support is to be established. In counterinsurgency, taking risk early is the safest option in the long run.

Introduction

The events of 9/11 signalled a new paradigm in international relations, re-assessing traditional concepts of power. It was quickly determined that Al-Qaeda had planned and coordinated the attacks from Afghanistan; capitalizing on the “hospitality” of the Taliban regime. The US response was swift. With the Taliban leadership failing to handover Al-Qaeda members residing in Afghanistan, in October 2001 the President of the United States authorized Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a search and destroy mission to “drain the swamps” in which the terrorists lived¹. Subsequently, at the NATO Conference in Bonn in December 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established. The NATO Treaty was evoked with lethal force being justified on the basis of “...an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”.² Activating Article 5 was significant because a treaty originally drafted to counter the Soviet threat legitimized action against a non – state actor. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were some that deemed the geostrategic environment as unipolar. However, the effectiveness of the strike by Al-Qaeda indicated that the geostrategic environment was now multipolar with numerous actors, both State and non – State. This challenged the traditional notion of power and statehood as advocated in the Realist³ paradigm.

ISAF has successfully established isolated pockets of stability in a number of the key population centers. However, maintaining a secure environment in rural areas has proved to be more of a challenge. In February 2010 a major joint offensive by Afghan, US and ISAF troops was conducted in Helmand Province. The purpose of Operation Moshtarak (dari for “together”) was to deny the Taliban the use of the town of Marjah as a strong hold and re-

establish an effective Government presence.⁴ With NATO partner nations reluctant to contribute forces, ISAF's ability to achieve an enduring effect has been limited. The commitment of an additional 30,000 troops by President Obama on 1 Dec 2009 may well address this issue.⁵ However, there are those that argue that the announcement of a timeline for the withdrawal of those forces beginning in July 2011 is counterproductive and indicative of a lack of commitment. Conversely, the announcement may prevent the international community becoming an unwanted force of occupation and give fresh impetus to President Karzai and his Government to establish the infrastructure necessary for sustainable self-governance.

Once again, Afghanistan is at the center of global geopolitical events. For centuries this landlocked territory has been of strategic significance due its location at the crossroads of Central, West and Southern Asia (Appendices A & B). A succession of invading armies, including the Mongols, Macedonians and Persians left their mark and thus the region is culturally diverse. Indeed, it is only when invaded that the plethora of indigenous tribes unites, consequently the track record for foreign intervention in Afghanistan is poor. In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew after a costly and unsuccessful ten year campaign. British Expeditionary Forces experienced a similar fate in the Nineteenth Century when deployed in Afghanistan to protect British interests in India. At present the US and ISAF have achieved more success than either previous intervention. However, it is imperative that the international community does not overstay its welcome, and thus hand over ownership of security to the Afghan Government in a timely manner.

This paper will focus on the British experience in Afghanistan from 1839 – 1919, during which three Wars were fought, and identify those lessons that can be applied to the current ISAF mission. Technology, political end states and the acceptable level of force have changed but the nature of the people that populate this volatile territory has not. Firstly, the strategic setting in the Nineteenth Century will be outlined followed by a synopsis of the Pashtun cultural code. The key events of the three Anglo-Afghan Wars are described and salient themes highlighted. After a brief update on the current ISAF mission, relevant lessons from the British experience are discussed. In conclusion, a way forward for current ISAF operations is given.

Afghanistan – One State, Many Nations

Afghanistan is a complex mix of ethnicities. Indeed, the biggest challenge facing any Afghan government is internal rather than external relations, as the primary allegiance of an Afghan is his tribe. The dominant ethnic group are the Pashtun who maintain a major influence in the Government and the military⁶. *Pashtunwali* is the cultural code to which a Pashtun adheres. It gives an insight into the distinct qualities associated with ethnic identity. The tenets that apply equally to men and women are: *Herat/Nang* (Bravery), *Badal* (Revenge), *Melmastia* (Hospitality), *Perdah* (Gender Boundaries), *Namus* (Face/Honor) and *Shura* (Council)⁷. These tenets form a code for living for the Pashtun and are prevalent throughout Afghanistan today in addition to sharia law. According to Palwasha Kakar Sharia is God's will for humanity and Pashtunwali are those tribal customs practiced by the honorable Pashtun.⁸

"The Pathan tribes are always engaged in private or public war. Every man is a warrior, a politician and a theologian. Every large house is a real feudal fortress

....Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan, its feud....Nothing is ever forgotten and very few debts are left unpaid.⁹”

Strategic Setting – “The Great Game”¹⁰

Karl E. Meyer defined the state of tension between the two great European powers known as “The Great Game” as “the clandestine struggle between Russia and Britain for mastery of Central Asia¹¹.” In the mid Nineteenth Century, Britain’s Empire was at its zenith; indeed Britain possessed a third of the known world and was the “superpower” of its era. The “Jewel in the Crown” of the Empire was India. British India was administered by the Honourable East India Company, a commercial firm beholden to private share holders that was directly supported by the British military.¹² Commercial interests were therefore paramount. There was concern in London and Calcutta that the North-West Frontier of the Empire, what is today the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was a key vulnerability and could be susceptible to attack (Appendix A). An apparently expanding Czarist Russia was the greatest threat. A plan was developed to establish Afghanistan as a compliant “buffer state” to prevent the compromise of imperial mercantile interests.

J.R. Seeley heavily influenced British strategic doctrine. In his popular work *The Expansion of England* (1883), Seeley expressed the need for the British to be vigilant throughout Central Asia: “The reason is that we have possession of India, and a leading interest in the affairs of all those countries which lie upon the route to India. This and only this involves us in that permanent rivalry with Russia, which is for England of the Nineteenth century what the competition with France for the New World was to her in the eighteenth century.”¹³ Implicit in this statement was the British view that as the predominant imperial power, they had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any state whenever it was

determined to be in Britain's national interest. The sovereignty of other states was a secondary consideration.

The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839 – 1842)

A territorial dispute between the Sikh leader Maharajah Ranjit Singh and the Afghan Monarch Amir Dost Mohammed over possession of Peshawar sowed the seeds of the first Anglo-Afghan War. Both leaders sought British support. Lord Auckland chose to support Ranjit Singh and ordered an invasion of Afghanistan in order to depose Amir Dost Mohammed and restore ex-Amir Shah Shuja to the throne. The intent was not to colonize Afghanistan but to control the nation's foreign policy and in so doing neuter the perceived threat to British India posed by Czarist Russia. Faced with a complex situation Auckland took the decision most likely to achieve his objectives based on previous experience. As W.K. Fraser – Tytler states, "To replace one ruler by another in a country which had transferred its allegiance eight times in the past forty-five years did not seem a formidable project, nor one which was likely to present much difficulty to a power whose progress in the domination of India had been one of steady and unbroken success."¹⁴ The original plan was for the Sikhs to supply the strike force. This was deemed to be the least costly for the British.

A calamitous campaign ensued, ending in one of the biggest defeats in British military history. All three parties signed an agreement known colloquially as the "Treaty of Simla" on 25th June 1838. This authorized Maharajah Singh to retain Peshawar and to assist Shah Shuja as required¹⁵. In return, Shah Shuja agreed to accept British control over Afghan foreign policy and to relinquish certain territory in the Indian province of Sind for which he received appropriate payment. Shah Shuja had reputedly promised the British that if he was reinstalled he would open up the trade routes to Turkistan. Superficially, Lord Auckland

appeared to have achieved his strategic objectives. In an attempt to justify the invasion, Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto in October 1838. In what is now regarded as a “patently dishonest piece of propaganda,”¹⁶ Auckland denounced Amir Dost Mohammed claiming that he had expansionist aspirations that threatened India. In addition, the proposed British exit strategy was outlined, “the Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn.”¹⁷

The “Army of the Indus” totalled some 39,000 troops including British, Indian and Sikh Units. The first significant Afghan position was the fortress city of Ghazni which was secured on 23 July 1839. In one engagement Amir Dost Mohammed had lost his strongest outlying fortress and over 600 of his troops were killed with another 1000 captured.¹⁸ It was following this highly successful attack by the British that the Amir sent emissaries to the British commander offering terms. These were promptly rejected.

Following the routing at Ghazni, the Amir struggled to raise support in Kabul and withdrew. Consequently, the Army of the Indus entered Kabul unopposed on 7 August 1839. The British disbanded the Army of the Indus on 1 January 1840, although a small element remained in the Afghan region to support the Amir Shuh Shuja.¹⁹ The disbandment of the Expeditionary Force proved premature. The Afghan people initially reacted slowly to the British invasion. However, once ignited, the Afghan response was swift and decisive. Somewhat to the surprise of the British, Dost Mohammed surrendered himself to the senior British Political Officer, Sir William Macnaghten, after which he was exiled in India. Dost

Mohammed sensed the violence that was ahead and chose to let others secure his throne for him.²⁰

Do s t Mohammed read the situation differently to the British. What he judged as a lull in the battle was assessed as stability by the Expeditionary Force. Troops were quickly withdrawn from Afghanistan. Concurrently, the British administration in India sought to cut costs and with little warning halved the subsidies paid to those Afghan tribes that held vital ground on the British Lines of Communication²¹. This was another poor decision by the British and they very quickly found themselves incurring heavy resistance in areas where they had previously enjoyed safe passage. This led to the garrison at Kabul remaining under strength.

The senior British military commander was Major General William Elphinstone. A veteran of Waterloo, he was in poor health and regarded as reactive rather than proactive. Events built to a bloody crescendo rapidly. On 2 November 1841 Afghan tribesmen massacred Shah Shuja's Gurkha battalion at Charikar and the senior British political officer in Kabul, Sir Alexander Burnes, and two of his colleagues were murdered outside the official Residency²². Afghans viewed the lack of violent and timely retribution by Elphinstone as weakness and this fanned the flames of insurrection. Afghans quickly besieged the encampment outside Kabul and it came under relentless artillery fire from the surrounding hills. Elphinstone ordered reinforcements from Kandahar but snow now blocked the route and the troops were unable to get through²³. Aware of the gravity of the situation, Sir William Macnaghten attempted to open negotiations with Afghan leaders, but to no avail. Amir Shah Shuja remained disengaged in his fortress at Bala Hissar. With winter closing in and lack of supplies becoming an issue, it was decided that the entire garrison would

withdraw to India. The retreat from Kabul began on 6 January 1842. The Afghans harassed the unwieldy column of 4,330 soldiers and over 12,000 followers throughout their withdrawal, systematically killing all but a handful.²⁴ The most famous survivor to reach Jalalabad was Assistant Surgeon Brydon, himself wounded on a wounded horse²⁵. The British retreat from Kabul was one of the greatest disasters in British military history and emboldened the Afghan leadership. Having safely avoided conflict this far, Amir Shah Shuja finally ventured from his fortress on 25 April 1842 and was promptly assassinated by a Barakzai.²⁶ His death led to infighting between several factions and eventually one of his sons, Fateh Jang, emerged as a successor.

In February 1842 Ellenborough replaced Lord Auckland as Governor-General. Ellenborough was keen to extract British troops from Afghanistan. He assessed the victories at Jalalabad and the Khyber Pass as evidence of the restoration of British prestige and the fulfilment of prescribed conditions for British withdrawal back to India. He consequently issued orders for British troops to extract, against the wishes of his subordinates. On receiving a missive from the Duke of Wellington advising swift retribution for the routing in Kabul, Ellenborough tasked Generals Pollack and Nott to march on Kabul and seek vengeance²⁷. On 15 September 1842, Pollack's troops entered Kabul. Many hundreds of Afghans were killed or executed. The British finally began their withdrawal back to India on 12 October 1842. While the British had achieved limited operational success, the Afghan region was left in a more volatile state than prior to the British intervention.

Assessment of First Anglo-Afghan War

Despite some limited operational success, the First Anglo-Afghan War was a strategic disaster for the British. The justification for the British intervention in Afghanistan in 1839

was at best questionable and the War quickly gained the sobriquet “Auckland’s Folly.”²⁸ The invasion was based on the flawed assumption that Shah Shuja had popular support. Despite some courageous victories at Kandahar, the Khyber Pass and Kabul, the catastrophic military failure that was the retreat from Kabul inflicted lasting damage upon British prestige and generated resentment amongst the Afghan tribes regarding foreign influence.

Leadership was a key factor throughout the campaign. Major - General Elphinstone was dangerously indecisive as a commander and dismissed out of hand an opportunity for diplomacy²⁹. Conversely, his successor demonstrated the value of determined leadership and achieved a notable operational victory when he successfully cleared the Khyber Pass.

Critically, the perception of operational success led to the withdrawal of British troops. However, the Afghan tribes interpreted this as a lack of will. This lack of commitment was confirmed when the parsimonious administrators in India cut the subsidies to the tribes that secured the fragile lines of communication. With a pen stroke, allies became deadly opponents.

In the Simla Manifesto, Lord Auckland attempted to clarify the British reason for intervention in Afghanistan. The stated intent in replacing Amir Dost Mohammed with Shah Shuja was to establish a compliant leadership in Kabul and open up the trade routes to Turkistan. The campaign was counterproductive and did not achieve the stated aims. At great expense, both in lives and resources, the Army of the Indus had alienated a potential ally, Dost Mohammed, enraged the Afghan warrior tribes, and alerted the Russians to potential British expansionist tendencies.

The British intent in establishing compliant leadership in Kabul had been to neuter the perceived threat posed by Czarist Russia. However, they under-estimated the degree to which Afghan leadership was based on consensus and by rejecting an opportunity to enter negotiations with Amir Dost Mohammed, lost the opportunity to establish both profitable trade links and a powerful ally in the region. Indecisive leadership by Elphinstone simply alienated the Amir and enabled an insurrection to develop quickly. The British suffered a significant loss of prestige after the disastrous withdrawal from Kabul and the Afghan tribes were emboldened as a result.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881)

Prior to the first invasion, the Afghans had a reputation for friendliness and tolerance. The war changed this and thereafter the Afghans distrusted foreigners viewing them as potential aggressors and infidels.³⁰ Following the annihilation of the Army of the Indus, a power struggle ensued. Returning from exile, Dost Mohammed began to re-establish his authority and by 1863, following the seizure of Herat, he effectively ruled the territory that is today's Afghanistan.³¹ Following his death the same year, a civil war raged between his sons culminating in Sher Ali taking the throne in 1869. Sher Ali received a British subsidy and arms. However, he was adamant that Kabul would not host a European Officer.³²

The Indian Mutiny (1857-1858), known colloquially as the "Great Sepoy Mutiny" led to major political changes in the way in which British India was administered. The Honourable East India Company was formally phased out in December 1858 and authority passed directly to the British Crown³³. Formal authority for political and military matters was held in London and delegated to the Governor General, later referred to as Viceroy.

More sensitive to the perceived threat from Czarist Russia than his predecessor, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli responded quickly to news that a Russian diplomatic mission had arrived in Kabul with the dispatch of his own mission. In response to being refused entry to Afghanistan, the British sent the Amir an ultimatum, which expired on 20 November. Having received no response by the deadline, at dawn on 21 November 1878 an Anglo-Indian force crossed the Frontier.³⁴ The stated aim was to gain an apology from Amir Sher Ali for a perceived loss of face, to establish a British diplomatic mission in Kabul, a permanent military mission in Herat and primacy over negotiating rights.³⁵

Technological advancements, such as the telegraph and the Martini-Henri rifle appeared to give the British an advantage at the outset. However, at an early stage there was friction between the British political appointee in India, the Viceroy Lord Lytton and the senior Military Commander, the Commander-in-Chief India General Sir Frederick Haines. They disagreed over the disposition of troops and this ultimately led to the Viceroy issuing orders directly to Haines' subordinates causing confusion and disorder³⁶.

The British forces that advanced into Afghanistan deployed in three columns: the Kandahar Column (Lieutenant - General Donald Stewart), the Kurram Column (Major – General Frederick Roberts VC³⁷) and the Peshawar Field Force (Lieutenant – General Sam Browne VC). As the Peshawar Field Force advanced to clear the Khyber Pass, Robert's column entered the Kurram valley. The two-mile wide pass was blocked by an Afghan Army element at a feature known as Peiwar Kotal. At first light on the 1 December 1878, the British artillery engaged the Afghan encampment and the ensuing assault was highly successful. Roberts won the Battle of Peiwar Kotal having lost just 21 men.³⁸

Cognizant that his army had failed to stop the British advance, Amir Sher Ali requested assistance from the Russians. The Russians did not wish to be directly engaged with the British and advised the Amir to sue for peace. In a half-hearted gesture, the Amir offered to accept a British diplomatic mission on a temporary basis. The British flatly rejected this as by now they had Kabul firmly in their sights³⁹. Concerned about imminent retribution, the Amir fled to Mazar-i-Sharif where he died suddenly on 21 February 1879. His son, Yakub Khan, succeeded him as Amir in Kabul.⁴⁰

On 26 May 1879, the Treaty of Gandamak was signed. Amir Yakub ceded control of his foreign policy in return for British finance, arms and military support. A British political officer, Sir Louis Cavagnari, arrived in Kabul, and both sides agreed to promote trade and commerce⁴¹. This appeared to be a successful outcome for the British. However, this was not the case. On 3 September 1879, a riot erupted outside Cavagnari's official residence. In the chaos that ensued, artillery fire struck the residence and Cavagnari and his staff were killed.⁴² When Lord Lytton received this news, the British withdrawal from Afghanistan halted. Once again, swift retribution was sought. Lytton ordered Roberts to march at best speed with his formation to Kabul and execute all culprits of this act. Amir Yakub appealed to Roberts to allow the Afghans to settle the issue internally. Lytton ignored this request.⁴³

The Afghan Army subsequently established a line of defence some ten-miles south of Kabul along the Charasia Heights. This was rapidly defeated on 6 October 1879 by Roberts who launched a devastating flank assault along the heights. He arrived in Kabul two days later and swiftly implemented retribution, hanging 87 Afghans found guilty of violence against the British.⁴⁴ Roberts offered rewards for information relating to those who had fought the British and any Afghan with a weapon in a ten-mile radius was executed. On 13

October, Roberts conducted a victory march through Kabul. Amir Yakub abdicated two days later. An insurgency quickly developed, encouraged by the Mullahs who harnessed the Afghan resentment at the conduct of the British. However, the British successfully defeated two Afghan offensives.

Following a General Election in Britain, the Prime Minister appointed a new Viceroy in June 1880. Lord Ripon arrived with an agenda. Aware of the spiralling costs of the Afghan deployment, he ordered the complete withdrawal of British troops from the Afghan region. On 31 July 1880, Abdur Rahman became Amir and the withdrawal began. Lord Roberts received orders to relieve troops in Kandahar. In 20 days, his force of 10,000 troops covered 313 miles. The day after arrival in Kandahar (1 September 1880), Roberts launched an attack on Afghan troop positions. The Afghans reportedly suffered 1,200 casualties compared to only 40 soldiers from Roberts' force. The second Anglo-Afghan War officially ended on 23 May 1881⁴⁵

Assessment of Second Anglo-Afghan War

Once again, despite operational success the British failed to achieve their stated war aims. The British did not establish a Political Officer in Kabul and British trade and commerce did not gain access to the region. At the tactical level, the Martini-Henri and Snider rifles proved to be highly successful. At the strategic level, the telegraph system enabled timely communications between London, India and the commanders in the field. However, these technologies were not effectively employed. Indecision and character clashes led to compromises in command and control. On the Afghan side, the nascent Afghan Army lacked the leadership and discipline to fight effectively against a determined and well-

equipped opponent. Once again, the British had expended much “blood and treasure” only to sour relations in the region and suffer a further loss of prestige.

The Third Anglo-Afghan War (3 May – 8 August 1919)

The Afghans initiated the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Amir Amanullah was a radical nationalist and aware of the weariness of the British after “the Great War” he declared Afghanistan “fully independent, both internally and externally”⁴⁶ on 13 April 1919. On 3 May 1919, a small detachment of Afghan troops crossed the border into British India to control the water supply in the Khyber Pass. Indigenous tribesmen killed several Indians and the British interpreted this as an act of war. Amanullah hoped his actions would spark an uprising in India. This was not the case. The first battle of the war at Bagh on the 7 May was inconclusive for the British despite the use of aircraft from the newly established Royal Air Force to bomb the Afghan positions⁴⁷. The second battle of Bagh 4 days later was more decisive. The British suffered 8 dead where as the Afghan forces lost 65.⁴⁸

Amanullah convened a *Loya Jirga*⁴⁹ at which he appealed for a *Jihad* against Britain. His war plan was to advance on British India on three axes, through the Khyber Pass, down the Kurram Valley and against Quetta. Fighting began in the north on 13 May. Afghan defenders were found in strong defensible positions and capable of delivering accurate, sustainable small arms fire. With support from the RAF, British ground forces successfully assaulted two key Afghan positions. The British achieved a decisive victory at Spin Baldak on 27 May.

British achievements on the Central Front were more modest. Faced with a determined enemy under the command of trusted General Nadir Khan, Major General

Eustace withdrew his forces from Waziristan to reinforce a well-established British outpost some 30 miles away. This led to open revolt in Waziristan by 26 May. Following a RAF bombing offensive in Waziristan, General Nadir Khan wished to seize the initiative and on 28 May began an artillery bombardment on the city of Thal, which stood on the British-Afghan border. Thal was under siege for six days and although the resident garrison repelled the Afghans, the situation was perilous for those that survived the onslaught. Consequently, the British ordered a relief-in-place. Having dealt with Afghan resistance en route, Brigadier General Dyer arrived at Thal on 1 June 1919. He quickly went on the offensive, ordering four infantry units to move out from Thal advancing under a creeping barrage of artillery.

General Nadir Khan sent a message to Dyer's Headquarters stating that he had ordered a cease-fire pending negotiations. Dyer rejected the opportunity to negotiate. Intimidated by the considerable advancing force General Khan ordered an immediate withdrawal. It was as Brigadier General Dyer prepared to pursue the fleeing Afghans that he received news about the armistice. Both parties signed the agreement on 3 June 1919. The highly effective RAF bombing campaign brought the Afghans to the negotiating table quickly. The British honed this relatively new technology during the First World War and it was a capability that the Afghan Army could not counter.

It transpires that Amir Amanullah had been speaking about a potential cease-fire since 15 May. The British military commanders on the ground had been determined to conclude the war on the battlefield. However, the Commander-in-Chief India, General Sir Charles Monro was not confident how long he could successfully sustain the campaign and was concerned about the quality of some reinforcing units. Wary of over-committing his forces, General Monro welcomed the opportunity to establish a cease-fire. On 8 August 1919, the Treaty of

Rawalpindi was signed. The Afghans regained control of their foreign policy, both sides reaffirmed the Durand Line as the border, and the Afghans agreed not to intervene in the political affairs of the tribes along the North-West Frontier.⁵⁰

Assessment of Third Anglo-Afghan War

Although defeated on the battlefield the Afghans again achieved their strategic objective by establishing their sovereignty as a fully independent state. Once again, the British did not achieve their stated war aims despite operational success. The British troops had performed in a lacklustre manner on occasion, however, the advantage of motor transport and the courageous efforts of the RAF compensated. Most significantly for the Afghan people the Treaty of Rawalpindi represented the defeat of British imperialism. Once again, the stark lesson for the British was that operational success does not guarantee the achievement of strategic objectives.

NATO International Security Assistance Force

NATO authorized the ISAF mission in December 2001. The stated mission is as follows:

ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.⁵¹

The Commander of both the ISAF and the US Mission is General Stanley McChrystal. As at 3 March 2010 there were 44 troop contributing states in theatre with a total strength of 89,480.⁵² The theatre of operations is 650,000 km² (251,000 miles²) and divided by NATO into five Regional Commands (RC): North, Center, East, South and West. The Respective lead nation or nations for each RC are Germany, Italy/France, USA, Canada/Netherlands and Italy.

ISAF's strategic end state is under constant review. However, if Afghanistan achieves a level of stability, (that is governance, internal security and economic development) that mean that it no longer poses a threat to international security one might argue that ISAF has accomplished its mission.⁵³ The international community will need to remain engaged; however, the nature of the engagement would transition from security to a more educational and economic focus. Democracy is not a critical requirement for mission accomplishment.

The ISAF mission of nation building differs from the British intent in the Nineteenth Century. However, the Grand Strategy of "forward defense" is applicable to both. The British wished to establish a "buffer zone" to protect their interests in British and today NATO states and their partner nations wish to establish a stable Afghanistan in order to neuter the threat

posed by extremist non-state actors. However, the means to achieving these ends has changed. In an era when colonial powers considered the seizure of territory by force legitimate, there were few limits to the use of force. This is not the case in the modern geopolitical environment where the law protects a nation's sovereignty.

Lessons from the British experience: The Strategic Level

Leadership. Poor decision-making at the highest level led to the unnecessary and counterproductive interventions in Afghanistan. Due to the flawed assessment of Lord Auckland, the British engaged in a costly intervention that irreversibly damaged relations with the Afghan people. Evidence suggests that prior to the invasion Amir Dost Mohammed was "...favourably disposed towards the British Government...."⁵⁴ The decision to impose regime change was thus fatally flawed and immediately turned the fiercely independent Afghans from potential allies to zealous adversaries. Today it is vital that the local population perceive the Government of Afghanistan as representative and give it their support. This will remain a challenge in a state where ethnic ties have primacy and national identity is weak.

Intelligence. Poor intelligence contributed to strategic failure during the first two Anglo-Afghan Wars. In the first instance, had regime change been necessary the lack of popular support for Shah Shuja meant that failure was inevitable. The value of quality intelligence is timeless and emphasizes the need to develop strong links with the local population and have elements of the COIN Force live in the community. As General Petraeus stated "You can't commute to this fight....Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents."⁵⁵

Diplomacy. During each war, the opportunity to pursue a diplomatic solution arose following British success on the battlefield. However, on each occasion the British shunned further diplomacy once they had achieved military success. It is vital that diplomatic channels, whether official or unofficial remain open. The maintenance of dialogue will enable the development of sustainable solutions. Today, the rehabilitation of the reconcilable insurgent element currently proposed by President Karzai is one such solution.⁵⁶ Clausewitz stated that the result in War is never absolute⁵⁷ and it is therefore essential to employ all instruments of national power in order to achieve a sustainable solution.

Trade. One of the key reasons for the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878 was to safeguard the continued prosperity of the Honourable East India Company (British India) and with it the Empire. One might argue that pragmatic diplomacy between the British and the Afghan leadership that sought to develop trade links could have prevented unnecessary bloodshed. The development of a sustainable economic base for Afghanistan is of critical importance. The member states of NATO represent a lucrative export market. Establishing trade links between Afghanistan and the member states warrants investigation.

Maintenance of Lines of Communication (LOC). Due to the land-locked nature of Afghanistan, the British were utterly dependent upon their lines of communication for resupply. Due to the challenging nature of the terrain, there were several choke points for which safe transit was critical if military intervention was to be successful. In addition to holding vital ground, the British paid a subsidy to the relevant tribes to ensure safe passage. When bureaucrats in India unexpectedly halved this subsidy, it immediately created a logistical issue that jeopardized the mission. The LOC remain a critical vulnerability today. It

is therefore vital that ISAF continue to work closely with the Government of Pakistan to ensure that there is a coordinated approach to the region and that the LOC remain open.

Lessons from the British experience: Operational Level

Engagement with the local population. During Anglo-Afghan wars, the British took a very conventional colonial approach and minimized their interaction with the local population. Frequently demonstrating an unwillingness to negotiate, there was an assumption that as Europeans they were racially superior and had nothing to gain from engaging with the indigenous people. One might argue that through the application of robust force protection measures ISAF is operating in a similar manner. Engagement with the local community is often fleeting with the use of armored vehicles further preventing interaction. The desire to improve living conditions for the deployed troops has created a dichotomy in which the logisticians expend considerable resources supplying western comforts to deployed forces whilst elements of ground forces attempt to engage with the local population in a culturally sensitive manner. This does not resonate well and is illustrative of an implicit double standard. Deploying troops forward to live in the community alongside their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) colleagues is high risk and requires troops to live in more austere conditions. However, in order to be truly effective as a counterinsurgent it is essential for troops to immerse themselves in the culture and demonstrate a commitment to the population. In due course, this should develop a rapport with the local population and break the link between the insurgent and the people.

Use of Force. The British were highly successful at the operational level when they applied overwhelming force in a determined manner. However, the use of force was at times indiscriminate and such acts were counterproductive in the long term. Today minimising

collateral damage is crucial; however, this must not prevent the commander on the ground from striking enemy combatants in a timely, proportionate and decisive manner. Failure to respond robustly emboldens the insurgent and places lives at risk in the long term. This places significant responsibility on every commander on the ground as there is no margin for error. It is thus essential that all troops are conversant with their Rules of Engagement and realize the importance of the legitimate use of force in a counterinsurgency. The Afghan people are a pragmatic, robust people who understand the need for the use of lethal force. In this ancient culture, there is inherent respect for military commanders who act decisively and in a robust manner. However, the use of force must always be proportionate and precise. Excessive use of force by the British in the Nineteenth Century merely strengthened the Afghan will to oppose violently external intervention and negated the viability of a diplomatic solution.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study of history is vital in order to learn from the experience others. The British interventions in Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century provide clear lessons for those operating in the same environment today. Firstly, it is important to understand that the British intent was not to colonize Afghanistan, but to use it as a “buffer state” to defend India. The British therefore applied a more coercive approach than was used during colonization. The Grand Strategy driving British intervention at the time was one of “forward defense” of the homeland, in this case the defense of British India from the perceived threat from expansionist Czarist Russia. The strategic environment is different today however, parallels can be drawn. The strategic intent associated with the current intervention by the international community is the same: “forward defense” of the homeland from an external threat; in this


case extremist non-state actors. Secondly, Pashtun culture has not radically changed since the Nineteenth Century. The tenets of *Pashtunwali* still have a significant influence upon the conduct of the largest ethnic group and thus define the national character, which is unique. Whilst the Pashtun are renowned for their infighting they quickly unite against external influence. Leadership in Afghan society is based on building consensus rather than more formal authoritative hierarchies. The British overlooked this and assumed that a newly installed Amir would have immediate authoritative control of his people. This was not the case in a culture where each tribe is fiercely independent. It is therefore vital that those engaging with the local population understand the relevant social dynamic, avoid “mirror imaging” and adjust expectations accordingly.

Study of the three Anglo-Afghan Wars has highlighted the ineffectiveness of military force alone in achieving a sustainable solution. The British were able to seize key cities, but without the support of the population, they did not control the State. As Gregory Fremont-Barnes succinctly states in his account of the Anglo-Afghan Wars: “The mere establishment of a government at the behest of a foreign power is no substitute for one that enjoys broad support across the country, untainted by accusations that it serves a foreign master.”⁵⁸

In order to be successful with the current mission, it is essential that ISAF focus on creating the conditions that will enable the Afghan people to govern themselves in the manner that they choose rather than one which is chosen for them. A governmental system that represents tribal interests is most likely to succeed. At the operational level the political leadership of the NATO member states must accept a higher level of risk and permit troops to live and work with their Afghan counterparts in the community, much like the Combined Action Platoon concept successfully employed by the U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam.⁵⁹ In

order to have credibility it is essential that selected elements of ISAF live in the same conditions as their Afghan colleagues using host nation support whenever possible. This will provide a tangible sense of security for the people and thus increase the influence of the Afghan Government while enabling the troops to gain a better understanding of the population and breaking the link between the population and the insurgent. Expeditionary Forces, such as Royal Marine Commandos, thrive in the austere conditions of the “Green Zone”⁶⁰ in Helmand Province. Only by living amongst the people can one begin to understand the dynamics of the local community. Force protection sensitivities at the highest level are preventing the realization of the latent potential of more specialist troops. The irony of the counter-insurgency is that taking risk early is the safer option in the long run.

Regional Map of Afghanistan (1893)



Source: Library of Congress. Accessed: 20 Feb 2010. [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/gmd:@field\(NUMBER+@band\(g7630+ct001040\)\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/gmd:@field(NUMBER+@band(g7630+ct001040)))

Regional Map of Afghanistan (2010)



Source: "worldatlas.com." Accessed 18 Jan 2010.

<http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/af.htm>

CHRONOLOGY⁶¹

AD: 8th Century Islam penetrated the Afghan region.

- 1219: Genghis Khan and his Mongol Armies sweep into the Afghan region.
- 1398: Timur led a Mongol invasion of the Afghan region.
- 1525: Babur the Tiger, an Afghan warlord, descends on India.
- 1600: (British) Honourable East India Company formed.
- 1747: Amir Ahmad Shah became dominant in the Afghan region.
- 1773: Amir Timur Shah succeeded his father.
- 1793: Amir Zaman Shah (blinded and deposed in 1801).
- 1801: Amir Mähmoud Shah (deposed in 1803).
- 1803: Amir Shah Shuja (deposed in 1809).
- 1809: Amir Mahmud Shah (returns – retains title until 1818).
- 1818: Sikh army seized Peshawar.
- 1825: Unsuccessful Russian attempt to take Khiva (Turkistan).
- 1826: Dost Mohammed gained suzerainty over Ghazni.
- 1828: Russians defeat Persians.
- 1829: Amir Kamran Shah (driven from Kabul to Herat, murdered in 1842).
- 1837: Afghan and Sikh armies clash in the Khyber Pass.
- 1838: Tripartite Treaty, and Simla Manifesto.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| 1839: 23 July: | Battle for Ghazni. |
| 7 August: | Kabul occupied by the Army of the Indus. |
| 18 September: | Major part of the Army of the Indus marched out of Kabul. |
| 1840: 1 January: | Army of the Indus disbanded. |
| 2 November: | Amir Dost Mohammed surrendered to the British. |
| 1842: 6 – 13 January: | British retreat from Kabul. |
| 13 January: | British last stand at Jagdalak. |
| 6 March: | British surrender at Ghazni. |
| 5 April: | General Pollock forced the Khyber Pass. |
| 7 April: | Battle of Jalalabad. |
| 25 April: | Amir Shah Shuja assassinated at Kabul. |
| June: | Fateh Jang became Amir (abdicated in October). |
| 30 August: | Battle of Karabagh. |
| 4 September: | Ghazni re-entered by the British. |
| 12 September: | General Pollock at Tezmin Pass. |
| 15 September: | General Pollock in Kabul. |
| 12 October: | British-Indian forces marched out of Kabul. |
| December: | Dost Mohammed returned to Kabul as Amir. |
| | First Anglo-Afghan War ended. |

1855:	Anglo-Afghan Treaty.
1863:	Amir Dost Mohammed died.
1868:	Amir Sher Ali (regained power).
1873:	Anglo-Russian Understanding.
1878:	Treaty of Berlin.
August:	Russian mission arrived at Kabul
1878: 21 November:	Second Anglo-Afghan War began.
22 November:	Battle for the Khyber Pass.
1 December:	Battle of Peiwar Kotal.
1879: 21 February:	Death of Amir Sher Ali.
1879: 26 May:	Treaty of Gandamak.
3 September:	British Political Officer assassinated in Kabul.
6 October:	Battle of Charasia.
8 October:	General Roberts reaches Kabul.
11 October:	Amir Yakub Khan abdicates.
December:	General Roberts besieged in Kabul.
24 December:	Siege of Kabul lifted.
1880: 19 April:	Battle of Ahmad Khel.
27 July:	Battle of Maiwand.
31 July:	Abdur Rahman became Amir.
8 – 31 August:	Roberts's March from Kabul to Kandahar.
11 August:	British march out from Kabul.
1881: 23 May:	End of the Second Anglo-Afghan War.
1885: March:	Pendjeh crisis.
September:	Anglo-Russo Agreement.
1893:	Anglo-Afghan Convention.
1901:	Death of Amir Abdur Rahman (succeeded by Amir Habibullah).
1905:	Anglo-Afghan Treaty.
1907:	Tri-National Convention.
1919: 19 February:	Amir Habidullah assassinated (succeeded by Amanullah).
3 May:	Third Anglo-Afghan War began.
7 May:	Peshawar Uprising aborted.
9 May:	First Battle of Bagh.
11 May:	Second Battle of Bagh.
18 May:	Battle of Dakka.
24 May:	Kabul bombed by RAF.
27 May:	Battle of Spin Baldak.
28 May – 1 June:	Siege and Battle of Thal.
3 June:	Armistice.
8 August:	Treaty of Rawalpindi.
	End of the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Brigadier-General John S. Brown USA, *The US Army in Afghanistan – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001 – March 2002*.3.

² The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949 establishing a binding collective security agreement between Europe and the US to counter against the threat from the Soviet Bloc. Article 5 states; “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.

³ Hans J Morgenthau *Politics Among Nations*

⁴ ISAF Website. “Feb 20. Operation Moshtarak Update”. Accessed 21 Feb 2010.

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/article/isaf-releases/feb.-20-operation-moshtarak-update.html>

⁵ The White House Website. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Accessed 16 Mar 2010. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>

⁶ CIA Factbook: Prominent ethnic groups are Pathan (Pashtun) (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%), Aimak (4%), Turkmen (3%), and Baloch (2%) with other ethnicities accounting for the remaining 4% of the population of 28.4 million.

⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Hawkins DSM and Bar, Australian Army, *The Pashtun Cultural Code: Pashtunwali* (Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 180, 2009). 17.

⁸ Palwasha Kakar, *Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority*, Harvard Law School Website. Accessed 17 Mar 2010. <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf>

⁹ Winston Churchill, *My Early Life* (London: Eland, 1930). 10. (In Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 180, 2009).17.

¹⁰ The term “The Great Game” was first coined by military historian Sir John Kaye when citing letters from Lieutenant Arthur Conolly (6 Bengal Native Light Cavalry) who conducted the first covert reconnaissance missions beyond the Khyber. It was introduced to common parlance in Rudyard Kipling’s novel *Kim* (1901).

¹¹ Karl E. Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows – The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia*.xviii.

¹² Stephen Tanner. *Afghanistan – A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*. (Cambridge MA: De Capo Press, 2002). 131.

¹³ J.R.Seeley. *The Expansion of England*, 1883, quoted in Karl E. Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows – The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia*.xix.

¹⁴ W.K. Fraser – Tytler KBE, CMG, MC, *Afghanistan – A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 106.

¹⁵ Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey’s, 1993),10.

¹⁶ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002),43.

¹⁷ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002),44.

¹⁸ Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey’s, 1993),13.

¹⁹ Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey’s, 1993),13.

²⁰ Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey’s, 1993),15.

²¹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),15.

²² Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),17.

²³ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),17.

²⁴ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),20.

²⁵ The haunting image of Assistant Surgeon Brydon's arrival at Jalalabad as the sole survivor of the British retreat from Kabul was painted by Elizabeth Butler in 1879. Entitled "Remnants of an Army" it is on display at The Tate Gallery, London.

²⁶ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),22.

²⁷ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),24.

²⁸ Library of Congress Country Studies, *Afghanistan The First Anglo-Afghan War* ([http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0012\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0012))) Accessed on 12 January 2010.

²⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993),16.

³⁰ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002),52.

³¹ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002),55.

³² Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002),57.

³³ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 31.

³⁴ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 53.

³⁵ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 52.

³⁶ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 37.

³⁷ The Victoria Cross, first awarded in 1857, remains Britain's highest award for gallantry.

<http://www.victoriacross.org.uk/aahistor.htm> Accessed 16 Mar 2010.

³⁸ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 41. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 58.

³⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 41.

⁴⁰ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 41.

⁴¹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 42.

⁴² Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 42.

⁴³ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 43.

⁴⁴ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 43.

⁴⁵ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 48.

⁴⁶ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 54.

⁴⁷ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 59.

⁴⁸ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 60.

⁴⁹ Loya Jirga: A Grand Assembly of tribal and Islamic leaders.

⁵⁰ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 85.

⁵¹ ISAF Mission Statement, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/> 18 January 2010.

⁵² ISAF Website. International Security Assistance Force Key Facts and Figures as at 3 March 2010. Accessed 17 Mar 2010. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/20100303%20Placemat.pdf>

⁵³ Codified in UNSCR 1510 (2003).

⁵⁴ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 38.

⁵⁵ General David H. Petraeus. "Multi National Force Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance" *Military Review* (September - October 2008), 2.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art004.pdf

⁵⁶ BBC News 21 January 2010 1809 GMT: *Afghanistan's Karzai moots Taliban peace scheme*. Link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8473215.stm Accessed 22 January 2010 1345 GMT.

⁵⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982), 108.

⁵⁸ Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 85.

⁵⁹ Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons – The U.S. Marines Other War in Vietnam*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

⁶⁰ "Green Zone" in Helmand refers to the irrigated green areas along the Helmand River which are key terrain for the Insurgent.

⁶¹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars 1839 – 1992 What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost* (London: Brassey's, 1993) , xv.